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Research Report | Islamic Shangri-La: Tibetan Muslim
Hybridity, Assimilation and Diaspora
ANHS Senior Fellowship Report
David G. Atwill

When I mention the topic of my research on Tibetan Muslims to many Americans, I am often met with an incredulity bordering on outright skepticism. At the heart of this
reaction is the commonly held belief that to be Tibetan is
to be Buddhist. Thus, the term “Tibetan Muslim” at first
glance appears to be an oxymoron. As a result, particularly in western literature, Tibetan Muslims if identified
at all, are classified as perpetual non-natives. Yet such
characterizations are at variance with indigenous Tibetan
perspectives that have long accepted Tibetan Muslims
(Tib. Khache) as Tibetans. Prior to 1959, Tibetan Muslims
served in the Tibetan government and even as administrative assistants to several Dalai Lamas.
The lingering definitional impediments to accepting
the Tibetan Muslims as Tibetans became infinitely more
complex in 1960 when the Indian government successfully
negotiated the resettlement of nearly a thousand Khache
from Lhasa, Shigatse, and Tsetang into India. (For a fuller
accounting of this incident see my recently published
article “Boundaries of Belonging: Sino-Indian Relations
and the 1960 Tibetan Muslim Incident,” Journal of Asian
Studies 1: 1-26, 2016.) Unlike their Tibetan Buddhist
neighbors who fled Tibet arriving in India as refugees, the
Tibetan Muslims were accorded Indian citizenship as a
result of their Kashmiri ancestry. In the intervening half
century, largely as a result of this difference in status, the
Dharamsala-based Tibetan government-in-exile did not
actively include the Tibetan Muslims in their government
or elections.

When I was selected as the ANHS Senior Fellow, the longterm implications of the displaced person status of most
Tibetan Buddhist refugees as compared to the Tibetan
Muslim status as citizens ranked high on the list of questions I hoped to ask the leaders of the Tibetan Muslim
communities in Srinagar, Kathmandu, and Darjeeling.
Yet it is their status in Kashmir that most interested me.
Tibetan Muslim settlements have existed in Srinagar for
over fifty years, making them a familiar fixture within
Srinagar society, yet their identification as Tibetans (and
refugees) still rankles.
Almost all Khache in Srinagar prefer to be called ‘Kashmiri.’ When asked to elucidate, one elder Khache explained,
“We are basically Kashmiri, but people still call us Tibetans which hurts us.” Another person with whom I spoke
put even a sharper edge on his response. “Don’t call us
Tibetans,” he said before adding “We are not refugees. We
are Kashmiris.”
Such a reaction stems in large part out of the fact that
although granted Indian citizenship, they were declared
as non-state subjects within Jammu and Kashmir. As such,
the Tibetan Muslims could not purchase property, vote, or
avail themselves of the educational benefits of their fellow
Kashmiri. The lack of such rights has resulted in many of
the community to pursue Kashmiri citizenship (legally
defined as State Subjects).
The situation of the Tibetan Muslims in Kashmir paralleled on many levels the efforts of many exiled Tibetan
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Buddhists. As displaced persons, they had few rights, even
after five decades of residency in India. This situation is
changing as the result of key court cases involving several Tibetan Buddhists born in India prior to 1982 yet were
denied Indian citizenship. In response to these cases, the
Election Commission of India, in 2015, ordered State Commissions “to include all people of Tibetan origin born in
India between 1950 and 1987.”
In slightly different contexts, the Tibetan Buddhist and
Tibetan Muslim communities are again are facing very
similar questions about the ways their decision to leave
Tibet has affected their Tibetan identity. It was with these
questions in mind that I approached my ANHS-sponsored
research, lining up more than two dozen interviews in
Srinagar with a wide array of Tibetan Muslims who now
reside in Dubai, Kathmandu, and Darjeeling but had agreed
to meet me in Srinagar. All was in place, and indeed all my
contacts informed me of their arrival in Srinagar. The illtimed death of Burhan Muzaffar Wani, a commander of the
Azad Kashmir-based Hizbul Mujahideen was killed, which
led to strikes, government imposed curfews, and violent
clashes with government forces resulting in nearly eighty
deaths.
This violence prevented my visit to Srinagar. However, my
other interviews in Kathmandu, Darjeeling and Kalimpong, allowed me to query Tibetan Muslims and Tibetans
about their interpretation of their status in the eyes of
their own community and that of the broader Indian state.
Many Tibetan Buddhists I interviewed, suggested that the
refugee status might be deliberately held in an unspoken
agreement by both Indian and the Government-in-Exile to
maintain the pressure on China to “free Tibet.”
In the last year and a half, however, those Tibetans born in
India (before 1982) after a long court battle were allowed
to become Indian citizens as well. Such a choice is both
an emotional and financial one, given that many in the
exile Tibetan Buddhist community believe that they “are
not immigrants, but political refugees waiting to return
home,” as one of my interlocutors said to me. “We cannot
settle in exile. Our rights are in Tibet, not in India.” But
now more than a half century after the Dalai Lama fled,
many Tibetan youth seek the opportunities denied them
by remaining refugees.
The choice for Tibetan Muslims was very different, since
they entered India in 1960 as Indian citizens but have been
largely excluded from both Kashmiri and Tibetan-in-exile political activities, despite the Dalai Lama’s consistent
inclusive attitude towards Tibetan Muslims. The contrast
between the experiences of these two groups highlights
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the very different road traveled after centuries of shared
experiences in Lhasa. What both groups continue to share,
however, is the lingering desire to retain their half-century old ties to a land most of the Tibetan youths I interviewed have never visited.
Keywords: Islam, Tibet, Tibetan Muslim, Khache, ethnicity,
transnational, China, India, Nepal, diaspora.
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